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I. THE EDITOR 
In March 1982, the Unit for the Study of Government at Edinburgh 
University held a seminar on changing central-local government rela-
tions, for academics, Civil Servants and local government officials, 
outwith the glare of press publicity. This allowed a degree of plain 
speaking and informed debate about the issues, which helped to ill-
uminate the shifting relationship between central government and lo-
cal authorities. 
The major speakers included the then-Minister responsible for 
local government at the Scottish Office, Malcolm Rifkind; the re-
cently elected president of COSLA, John Sewel; and two chief offi-
cers from regional authorities, Eric Geddes from Central Region, and 
Robert Calderwood from Strathclyde. Sewel and Calderwood have pro-
vided two brief papers outlining the issues as they saw them. 
In the course of the discussion and debate, a number of issues 
arose, some not normally part of the conventional discourse, which 
merit relaying to a wider audience. 
Participants agreed that the conflict between central and local 
government was, in essence, a political one, though not simply in 
conventional terms, between a Tory government and Labour local authori-
ties. The 'threat' to local government was not simply of the making of 
the present government; Calderwood points out that the economic di-
fficulties in the mid 1960s marked an important turning of the screw. 
Others thought that the screw had been turned much earlier, even in 
the 1940s, though others counselled against invoking a 'golden age' of 
local government in which, usually, 'politics' was absent. The inher-
ent weakness of local authorities, as John Sewel points out, lies in 
their over-dependence on central grants, and in the inelastic and 
politically contentious character of rates as a source of revenue. 
Nevertheless, the failure of the economy to grow in real terms, 
and, since the mid 1970s, the cutting of public expenditure, has 
strengthened central government's powers, and reinforced the centra-
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The peculiarity of the relationship between the Scottish Office 
and local authorities in Scotland has given the conflict a special 
dimension. As Edward Page(l) has pointed out, the scale of government 
in Scotland, and the coordinated powers of the Scottish Office can 
lead not only to more 'friendly' relations, but to closer central con-
trol over local authority spending. In essence, many agreed, the con-
flict b tween central and local government was an argument about Man-
dates. Rifkind and Calderwood argued that ultimately 'Parliament' 
(rather than 'Government') had the superior Mandate in constitutional 
terms, although, practically, some recognition of the Mandate given 
to local councillors had to be recognised. Behind it all, lay the 
(largely unspoken) problem for a Conservative Government of administ-
ering a largely non-conservative electorate in Scotland. 
It was agreed that we were living through a period in which cher-
ished assumptions and longstanding arrangements were being challenged.
Great pressure is building up to remove further spheres of competence 
from local government controL Of these, education seems the main tar-
get. Not only does it represent upwards of 40% bf Regional Council 
expenditures, but there is pressure, at least from teachers' unions 
and education officials, to 1 depoliticise 1 education. Housing, which 
accounts for well over half of most District Council expenditure, is 
another threatened area, although the political significance of hous-
ing in Scotland is likely to make any central government think twice. 
The question of local control over the police has been a vexa-
tious issue, especially south of the border, although relations in 
Scotland are, to date, less contentious. In general terms, then, the 
division of responsibilities between different areas and levels of 
government is back on the political agenda, and there may still be, 
despite the old saw, 'votes in sewage'. 
The changing character of central-local government relations in 
Scotland are complex; the conflicts and struggles do not belong to 
one straightforward dimension, be it Scottish Office versus local 
authorities, or, at the party political level Conservative versus 
Labour. To elide these two simplifies relations even further, and 
yet it is this simplification which growX5 so much press and media 
discussion of the conflict. There is no denying, however, that these 
two dimensions are the most obvious and salient, but there are other 
dimensions which inform political conflict. As Scottish Office 
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Minister~ hint from time to time, there are bruising battles fought 
between the Scottish Office and the Treasury, which do not, in the 
interests of party unity, surface at all, but which are real enough. 
Hence the rather hurt comments from Ministers that local authorities 
and the media in Scotland are not appreciative enough of how hard 
they have defended their corner. 
There is a further dimension of conflict within local government 
which is potentially one of the most interesting of all. As Robert 
Calderwood indicates, local government officials are by no means the 
unthinking lackeys of their political masters. They have strong views, 
based upon professional competencies and experiences, about the nature 
and direction of local government. Alongside the more obvious party 
politicisation of local government in recent years has gone its pro-
fessionalisation and bureaucratisation. No longer is the omnidexter-
ous Town Clerk, 'local government'; instead there is a bureaucracy 
of highly trained officials plying their professional trades. As some 
officials pointed out, many Chief officers may not mind much if some 
local government responsibilities,such as education or housing, are 
removed from the control of local politicians reacting, as they see 
it, to the whims and fashions of local electorates. It might make the 
job of 'administration' much easier. Paralleling the official/councill-
or divide, but operating in a more shadowy way, similar potential 
strains may be operating between civil servants and Scottish Office 
Ministers- a Scottish version of 'Yes Minister'. 
These relationships between professional officials and bureau-
crats, and elected politicians are perhaps the poorest understood, yet 
among the most important which inform central-local government rela-
tions. Certainly civil servants and local government officials play 
important roles in the political game which informs central -local 
relations. They do not merely 'hold the jackets' of the battling 
politicians. 
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I I. JOHN SEWEL 
President, COSLA 
The past two years has seen the issue of central/local government 
relations placed firmly on the political agenda and frequently on the 
front pages of the Scottish press. Local government finance must be 
one of the most esoteric and, quite simply, boring subjects of politi-
cal debate. Yet within a period of little more than a year, conflict 
between central and local government over not only the level of local 
government expenditure but also the proper relationship between central
and local government gave rise to a dispute which took on constitu-
tional overtones. George Jones and John Stewart writing about the 
Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act saw Scot-
land being used as a test-bed for a less than honourable assault on 
the very essence of local government(l). 
The government has, therefore, in a cumbersome and 
indirect way taken' power that is equivalent to the 
power of direction over local government expenditure. 
The only reason that the power of direction has been 
achieved in this confusing way has presumably been to 
conceal the fact that what is involved is a change of 
great constitutional importance. The very basis upon 
which local government exists, the very reason for the 
existence, had been destroyed. The Secretary of State 
is seeking to remove from selected authorities in 
Scotland the right (which still exists in England and 
Wales) to determine their own levels of expenditure 
as long as it is financed from their own taxes. 
What are the origins of this attack upon local government? Put 
at its simplest a government which has sought to reduce both publiG 
expenditure and the PSBR within .the context of a declining tax-take 
and increasing unemployment and social security payments, has identi-
fied local authority expenditure as an area where it is both ideologi-
cally sound and practically possible to make savings. Through the 
COSLA Critique, the Heald, Jones and Lamont article in last year's 
Yearbook and the writings of Arthur Midwinter, the details of the 
expenditure debate between central and local government are now well 
documented. The quality of the reports by David Scott in The Scotsman 
and Francis Horsburgh in the Glasgow Herald has led to a wider public 
being informed about the main elements of the dispute. The Scottish 
media has throughout been perhaps surprisingly sympathetic to the 
local government case. 
It is not necessary here to rehearse in detail local government's 
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side of the ar~tment. In brief, it is sufficient to reiterate the 
point that local government expenditure has not been rising uncon-
trollably. Over the period 1975/76 to 1980/81 local government expen-
diture has fallen in real terms from £2,662 million to £2,265 million!2 ) 
Over the same period the local government component of the Secretary 
of State's programmes declined from 57.6% to 51.2% whereas the cen-
tral government component rose from 38.7% to 46.6%( 3 ). At the very 
least the record demonstrates that there is no basis upon which it is 
fair or reasonable to describe Scottish local government as being fin-
ancially reckless. 
The fact that for the year 1982/83 56 out of a total of 65 Scott-
ish local authorities budgeted above their Scottish Office calculated 
expenditure guideline shows how out of touch with reality the govern-
ment has become in making a judgement about the appropriate level of 
local government expenditure. There is a genuine and general dispute 
between central and local government that results from the widening 
divergence between central government's plans for local authority ex-
penditure and the performance of the vast majority of Scottish coun-
cils as they wrestle with the problem of providing an acceptable level 
of service without imposing higher than necessary rate burdens. It is 
not a matter of a simple partisan dispute between a Conservative Sec-
retary of State and a few truculent Labour councils. Traditionally, 
local authorities have exercised the right to decide their own level 
of spending in response to local needs and in reflecting locally de-
termined priorities. Of course, it has been recognised by local auth-
orities that the Secretary of State has a legitimate right to use a 
series of powerful measures in order to seek to influence the level 
of local government spending. Through cutting the base of relevant 
expenditure, reducing the rate support grant percentage, altering the 
balance between the needs and resources elements within the rate 
support grant and by imposing cash limits, the Secretary of State has 
at his command an array of measures which have in the past been used 
to influence local authorities to contain expenditure. Local govern-
ment may, and in recent years undoubtedly has, found the Secretary 
of State's use of these powerful weapons distasteful, but the objection 
is different in kind to that of direct control. 
A legislative framework for direct, detailed, central control has 






























proposals contained within the Local Government and Planning Bill. 
The combined effect of these two measures is to give the Secretary of 
State power, subject only to the approval of a parliamentary order, 
to control the spending of any local authority he considers to be 
guilty of budgeting to incur 'excessive and unreasonable' expenditure. 
Central government is flagrantly substituting its view about the level 
of expenditure necessary to sustain local services for the views and 
judgements of locally elected representatives. Even if the legisla-
tion does not give him the power to limit an authority's spending on 
specific services (and here there is a disagreement on interpreta-
tion between the Scottish Office and COSLA), the type of negotiations 
between individual authorities and the Secretary of State which are 
virtually inevitable under the legislation create an opportunity for 
detailed bargaining over particular services which despite assurances 
to the contrary may not be long resisted. 
The argument of local government is that these powers are not 
needed. The expenditure record of Scottish local authorities, 
far from being irresponsible, has been creditable. But the argument 
and the objection goes deeper than this. The degree of central control 
that has now been established, significantly shifts the distribution 
of power away from localities to the centre, and the increasing centra-
lisation of decision-making undoubtedly has implications for a dis-
persed, pluralistic type of political system. 
There is more than a touch of irony in the fact that such an in-
crease in central control brought about in order to make local deci-
sions more compatible with centrally planned and defined objectives 
has taken place under a Conservative government, a government which at 
least initially promised to disengage from local government. It does, 
however, have to be recognised that one of the costs of maintaining a 
system of pluralistic politics is to accept that from time to time the 
level of local government spending might rise above that thought app-
ropriate by central government but in order to provide a strong and 
effective institutional bulwark against the authoritarianism of both 
the extreme left and the extreme right, that is a price we should be 
prepared to pay. 
1. 
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III. ROBERT CALDERWCXD 
Chief Executive 
Strathclyde Regional Council 
The relationship between central and local government o~er recent 
years seems to me so similar to the relationship I used to enjoy with 
my own family when we were playing rummy. The rules were infinitely 
variable and never to the advantage of father. In the present instance 
the variable factor is always in favour of central government because 
it determines the rules. I think, however, that it is a great pity to 
let skirmishing on the way in which the details are being manipulated 
obscure some very important points of principle. 
Local government is established by statute and is a creature of 
Parliament. The powers which created local authorities are the same 
powers vested in the same body which could be used to dissolve local 
authorities. Local government has, therefore, I believe, to acknow-
ledge the supremacy of Parliament and work within the rules. It is en-
titled to argue against some of the rules and to seek to change them 
but the system whereby central and local government complement each 
other will collapse if there is protracted and unresolved confronta-
tion between the two bodies. 
Local government has an essential part to play in spreading the 
public decision-making role over a wide field of individual public 
representatives. The concentration of decision-making powers at the 
political centre can lead too readily to the emergence of an un-
democratic or dictatorial regime. The existence of counter-balancing 
decision-making powers vested in elected representative bodies is, 
in my view, an essential prerequisite of the maintenance of a demo-
cratic society at local level with a reasonable level of public acc-
ountability. It is in everyone's interest that this should be the 
case and it, therefore, behoves all of us involved in central and 
local government to acknowledge the practical constraints which that 
jmposes on our respective freedoms of action within the law. 
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Local government has to acknowledge that it is the creature of 
Parliament and that whether or not it approves of the duties or ob-
ligations Parliament imposes upon it, it is there to comply with them. 
To argue against certain of these impositions is not, in my view, the 
same as challenging Parliament's right to impose these duties and ob-
ligations. Local government will lose, and in some issues is current-
ly losing, arguments with central government because some authori-
ties see themselves as alternatives within their own geographical 
areas to central government. 
There are those who argue that local authorities can spend what-
ever they feel it appropriate to spend provided the ratepayer is 
willing to pay and reflects that willingness in his choice o£ coun-
cillors at the periodic elections. The argument goes that, no matter 
how much a local authority spends, Government will still be entitled 
to limit its contribution by way o£ Rate Support Grant to whatever 
level it thinks appropriate. However sustainable that argument may 
have been and however much, as a supporter o£ local government, one 
would like to subscribe to it, it has within it the £law that some-
thing of the order o£ only ten per cent o£ the total rate fund ex-
penditure o£ local authorities in the UK is obtained direct £rom lo-
cal government electors. The remainder comes by way of Government 
grant through national taxation and £rom rates on commercial and in-
dustrial properties, in respect of which there is no one entitled to 
cast a vote at a local government election. I am not arguing for the 
restoration of the business vote but am simply acknowledging that if 
the electorate is being charged direct with no more than approximate-
ly ten per cent o£ total rate fund expenditure, it is a suspect argu-
ment to suggest that that electorate can sustain and legitimise un-
limited expenditure on the part o£ a local authority. (An interesting 
paper which touches on this theme of electoral accountability and 
local government expenditure was given by Professor Christopher Foster 
of Coopers & Lybrand Associates at the Association of Municipal Auth-
orities' Conference, Manchester, 11th September 1980). 
When so much money is expended by local government I find it not 
unreasonable that central government should seek to indicate the over-
all level of expenditure which it beli~ves the national economy can 
support. The problem for Government is that it seeks to do this by 
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controlling in considerable detail -despite protestations to the 
contrary - the expenditure of each and every local authority and, 
almost necessarily, the amount to be spent in specific service areas. 
Taking powers to require local authorities to fix a rate level lower 
than the one which they themselves would wish to levy is a clear move 
away from the principle that local authorities in general are respon-
sible organisations. Once you become imbued with a feeling that only 
the bureaucracy in central government is responsible you tend to 
lose sight of the importance of preserving that system o£ check and 
countercheck which local and central government can exercise the one 
upon the other. Equally central government then sets itself up as 
an alternative to local government in a geographical area. 
Ministers have stated that what has happened in the last two 
or three years is that the traditional willingness o£ local govern-
ment to respond to requests £rom central government has not been con-
tinued. I do not think that this is an accurate statement or a fair 
charge to be levelled at local government. It is based on the argument 
that local government manpower - a very heavy item in any budget -
has not been reduced to the level it reached immediately after the 
IMF loan in 1977. My impression is that; at that time, there were al-
most panic cuts made, with a total freeze on filling of sta££ vacan-
cies and the creation o£ a climate o£ crisis which c~dld be maintain-
ed for only a relatively short period of time. Overall manpower fig-
ures are going down, albeit slowly, but the yardstick o£ the 1977 
figure is a false and unrealistic base and if Government continue to 
use that they will perpetrate a conflict on a very unstable founda-
tion. It is really not so many years ago that the national plan her-
alded an anticipated increase in public expenditure of ~ per cent 
per annum. Now we are being invited to accept a decrease of something 
slightly more than 3~ per cent per annum. The provision of local auth-
ority services responsive to identified need is not geared to quick 
changes of pace in development or of assessment of needs. I believe 
Government is wrong to assume that, because reactions do not occur as 
quickly in local government as central government would wish, that is 
an act of defiance by local government in general. Special cases make 
bad law but special cases exist and I can appreciate Government frus-
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Government reaction. Danger to democracy comes when there is an over-
reaction. 
I do not doubt that central government will, as an obligation in 
the interests of the national economy, seek to influence the expendi-
ture levels of local government. I do not believe that experience 
suggests that this or other Governments have failed to do that in gen-
eral. I am concerned that what we are now seeing is a move towards 
direct control in the level of service provision by central government 
and I am concerned that that level of control is seen to be necessary 
because of underlying mistrust by central government of the ability of 
local authorities in general to be responsible. 
244 
 
